The low-cost RFID tags have very limited computing and storage resources and this makes it difficult to completely solve their security and privacy problems. Lightweight authentication is considered as one of the most effective methods to ensure the security in the RFID system. Many lightweight authentication protocols use Hash function and pseudorandom generator to ensure the anonymity and confidential communication of the RFID system. But these protocols do not provide such security as they claimed. By analyzing some typical Hash-based RFID authentication protocols, it is found that they are vulnerable to some common attacks. Many protocols cannot resist tracing attack and de-synchronization attack. Some protocols cannot provide forward security. Győző Gódor and Sándor Imre proposed a Hash-based authentication protocol and they claimed their protocol could resist the well-known attacks. But by constructing some different attack scenarios, their protocol is shown to be vulnerable to tracing attack and de-synchronization attack. Based on the analysis for the Hash-based authentication protocols, some feasible suggestions are proposed to improve the security of the RFID authentication protocols.
The RFID System, Its Security and Privacy

The Component of an RFID System
An RFID system usually consists of three components: Radio Frequency (RF) tag, RF reader and backend server, as shown in Figure 1 [5] . A tag is basically a silicon chip with antenna and a small storage. For an RFID system, a tag is a special device. Its computing and storage resource is very limited. There are two main types of tags: active tag and passive tag. Active tags include miniature batteries used to power the tags and they are capable to transmit data over longer distance. Passive tags don't have any battery and they are activated by the RF signal beamed from the reader. So passive tags are used for shorter range communication. This kind of tags is very cheap and they are usually called low-cost tags. These low-cost tags have become the most popular tags and they are widely used in many different fields.
A reader is a device capable of sending and receiving data in the form of radio frequency signal. This device is used to communicate with the tag and reads the identifier of the tag. A backend server is used to store the detail information about the tagged objects, and it cooperates with reader to implement the mutual authentication to tags. It searches the information about the tagged objects according to the tag's identifier. And it sends the information to the reader.
The Security and Privacy Issue of RFID Systems
As an important component of the RFID system, the tag usually has very limited computing and storage resources and it is difficult to implement some complicated cryptographic algorithms. But backend server and reader are usually considered to be resource-abundant and they can implement conventional cryptographic protocols effectively. So the channels between backend server and reader are secure and they are usually considered as a single entity, which is simply called the backend server/reader. However, because of the limited resources and the open wireless communication mode it has to assume that the channel between tag and reader is insecure.
Readers have electric power enough to transmit signals over longer distance and tags only have limited electric energy to transmit signals over shorter distance. So the communication channels between reader and tag are asymmetric. The channel from reader to tag is called forward channel and the channel from tag to reader is called backward channel. These two channels are open and insecure. Most secure problems of the RFID system are resulted from these insecure channels.
As a typical resource-constrained system, the RFID system is very vulnerable to some secure threats. Eavesdropping, impersonating, tracing, replaying and de-synchronization are some popular secure threats. Eavesdropping means that an adversary can intercept sessions between tag and reader by eavesdropping open wireless channel. These sessions are analyzed to reveal the secrecy about the tag. Once an adversary reveals the secrecy of the tag he can impersonate a legitimate tag to get the authentication from the backend server/reader. Tracing attack means that an adversary can identify which tag sends the messages intercepted by him and then he can trace the tag, even the objects or persons carried the tag. If a tag repeats to send some same messages during the authenticating process it is easy to be traced. Replay attack means that an adversary re-sends the previous sessions to impersonate a legitimate tag so as to get the authentication from the backend server/reader. De-synchronization attack means the backend server/reader and the tag cannot update their secret keys synchronously so that they possess different secret keys. This makes future authentication impossible. An adversary can implement de-synchronization attack by tampering, malicious blocking or abnormal closing the sessions between backend server/reader and tag.
Otherwise, a secure RFID system must satisfy forward security and anonymity. Forward security describes the capability to trace the events occurred during the past authentication process. Forward security guarantees that all authentication sessions, which happened before the tag's secret key is revealed, remain irrelevant. Once the current secret key is revealed, the previous authentication sessions are not deduced. So an RFID system has to regularly update its secret keys so as to satisfy forward security. Unfortunately, updating the secret keys of an RFID system often results in de-synchronization attack.
Some Typical Hash-Based RFID Authentication Protocols and Their Vulnerability
In order to solve the security and privacy problems of the RFID system, many RFID lightweight authentication protocols have been proposed in recent years. These authentication protocols usually use the one-way property of Hash functions to implement the confidentiality and anonymity of the RFID system. But most of them have serious security problems. These typical Hash-based authentication protocols are Hash-Lock protocol, Randomized Hash-Lock protocol, Hash-chain protocol, and so on. Based on the difficulty of inverting to solve an one-way Hash function, S. A. Weis, and S. E. Sarma et al. [6] firstly proposed Hash-Lock protocol, which attempts to provide mutual authentication between tag and reader. The protocol uses the pseudonym of the tag, metaID , to replace the actual tag's ID to ensure its privacy. During the authenticating process the plaintext of the tag's ID is transferred between tag and reader, and metaID is fixed. An adversary easily compromises mutual authentication by simply eavesdropping and replaying the sessions between tag and reader. So Hash-Lock protocol is vulnerable to spoofing attack and replay attack. Moreover, an adversary easily traces the tag's holder by the tag's identifier ID and its fixed pseudonym metaID .
In order to overcome the flaws of Hash-Lock protocol, S. A. Weis and S. E. Sarma et al. proposed randomized Hash-Lock protocol [6] . This protocol uses a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) to randomize the transferred sessions between tag and reader. Tags respond to reader's queries by generating a random value r, then Hashing its ID and concatenating the result with r, and sending them to the reader. A legitimate reader identifies one of its tags by performing a brute-force search of its known IDs . Then the reader sends the identified tag's ID to the tag by plaintext. It is easy for an adversary to eavesdrop and obtain the identity of the tag. Hence, it is vulnerable to spoofing and replay attack. Moreover, the tag's holder is easily traced and this protocol cannot satisfy forward security.
M. Ohkubo et al. firstly proposed Hash-chain protocol [7] . The aim of their protocol is to provide better protection for the user's privacy by refreshing the identifier of the tag. Different from Hash-Lock protocol, Hashchain protocol uses two different Hash functions,
( )
H and
G . This protocol only provides one-way authentication, namely, the reader authenticates the tag while the tag does not authenticate the reader. To achieve forward security, this protocol uses Hash chain technique to renew the secret key stored in the tag. But this protocol does not use a random number generator and it is vulnerable to spoofing and replay attack. Ohkubo et al.'s scheme has a complexity in terms of Hash computations of m n × , where m is the given maximum limit on Hash chain length and n is the total number of tags. Thus, when the number of tags or the chain length is large the computation becomes unimaginable for an RFID system. Another similar scheme was provided by Sang-Soo Yeo et al. [8] . The scheme gave a conceptually simple but elegant solution to defeat the tracing problem and to ensure forward security. This scheme requires each tag to support 2 Hash functions. When the tag is queried by a reader, it sends Hash value of its current identifier by using Hash function, ( ) G , then renews its identity information by using another different Hash function,
H . These protocols use two different Hash functions and it is not suitable to the low-cost RFID tags.
Yong Ki Lee et. al. proposed a secure and low-cost authentication protocol for the RFID system, Semi-Randomized Access Control (SRAC) [9] . It also uses a pseudonym, metaID , to replace the tag's ID like HashLock protocol. It provides mutual authentication and forward security. It can protect RFID systems from many attacks, such as tracing, cloning and denial of service. However, it is vulnerable to replay attack. The adversary can simply eavesdrop and reuse metaID to be authenticated successfully. Later, Su Mi Lee et al. used the challenge-response mechanism and proposed a low-cost RFID authentication protocol (LCAP) [10] . The aim of their effort is to solve the de-synchronized problem by maintaining a previous identifier in the backend server. This protocol provides mutual authentication and guarantees the location privacy of the tag's holder. It also provides untraceability by changing tag's identification dynamically. Nevertheless, it does not provide forward security, namely, an adversary can infer previous sessions about the tags after it reveals the present secrecy of the tags.
Jung-Sik Cho et al. [11] proposed a new Hash-based authentication protocol to solve the secure and private problems for the RFID system. However, Hyunsung Kim [12] demonstrated that this protocol is vulnerable to DOS attack. He pointed out that Jung-Sik Cho et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to traffic analysis and tag/reader impersonation attack. More precisely, an adversary can impersonate a valid tag or reader with probability 1/4. Finally, an adversary can obtain some information about the secrecy of the tag in the next session with probability 3/4. Therefore Hyunsung Kim proposed an improved protocol to offer protection against the attacks described above. But this enhanced version is as insecure as its predecessor. Walid I. Khedr [13] pointed out that an adversary can perform a de-synchronization attack by intercepting and tampering the transferred messages between tag and reader. Further, Walid I. Khedr justified that Jung-Sik Cho et al.'s protocol cannot ensure forward security. Masoumeh Safkhani and Pedro Peris-Lopez et al. [14] also constructed three different attacks to demonstrate Jung-Sik Cho et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to de-synchronization attack and tag/reader impersonation attack. Masoumeh Safkhani and Pedro Peris-Lopez et al. justified that the de-synchronization attack succeeds with probability 1 and the complexity of the attack is only one run of the protocol.
J. H. Ha and S. J. Moon et al. [15] proposed a Hash-based RFID security protocol and proved that their protocol can provide forward privacy. However, Da-Zhi Sun and Ji-Dong Zhong [16] pointed out that an attacker can track a target tag by observing previous unsuccessful sessions. Da-Zhi Sun et al. justified that J. H. Ha et. al.'s protocol fails to provide forward privacy as they claimed. Then they proposed another Hash-based authentication functions to overcome the weaknesses of J. H. Ha et al.'s protocol. But all these protocols use two different Hash functions. They require more computing and storage cost. They are not suitable for the low-cost RFID system. Liu Yang, Peng Yu et al. [17] proposed an RFID secure authentication protocol based on Hash function. Their protocol ensures the privacy of the tag's secret information and realizes three party mutual authentications Z. C. Shi et al.
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among tag, reader and backend server. But, for each authenticating process of the protocol, the tag and the reader call Hash function more than five times respectively. So their proposed protocol is so complicated that it is not suitable to the low-cost RFID system.
Győző Gódor and Sándor Imre [18] analyzed the typical Hash-based authentication protocols as described above. Then they proposed a Hash-based mutual authentication protocol for the low-cost RFID system, which is the G-I protocol. They claimed that their protocol provides an efficient mutual authentication. It can defy the well-known attacks and it provides stronger security than these protocols described above. But by analyzing, their protocol cannot prevent tracing attack and de-synchronization attack. We will focus on analyzing the G-I protocol in next section. Table 1 . This protocol is shown in Figure 2 and it is described as follows:
1. The backend server/reader sends a message, Query , to the tag.
2. After receiving the message, Query , the tag computes ( ) 1 h k and sends it to the backend server/reader.
3. The backend server/reader tries to look for the received ( ) then it authenticates the tag. After completing the authentication to the tag the backend server/reader updates its secrecy as follows:
6. After the backend server/reader has updated its secret keys, it sends " Update key − " to the tag. The tag receives " Update key − " and it updates its secret keys as follows: Table 1 . The symbols used in the G-I protocol. 
The Vulnerability Analysis of the G-I Protocol
Győző Gódor and Sándor Imre claimed that their protocol can resist eavesdropping, replaying, tracing and spoofing. It is very strong against de-synchronization attack and it provides forward and backward security. But by analyzing, it is found that their protocol is vulnerable to de-synchronization attack and tracing attack. The G-I protocol doesn't provide their claimed security. One reason, which results in the vulnerability of the protocol, is that the protocol cannot keep the freshness of the sessions between backend sever/reader and tag. Another reason is the worse property of exclusive OR operation and the messages, Query and Update key − , are not signed by their sender before they are sent.  Tracing attack.
In order to enhance the scalability and anonymity of the G-I protocol, ( )
